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RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1234
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RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0293
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1505
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2772
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1914
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1303
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0855
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0796

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001024

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [ASEC](#) [CD](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: EASTERN CHAD/SUDAN: PERSPECTIVES FROM DPA
NON-SIGNATORIES AND SIGNATORIES

Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) and (D)

11. (C) SUMMARY: Darfur Peace Accord signatories and
non-signatories from the Sudanese rebel movement residing in
Chad continue to accuse each other of being responsible for
the recent violence in Darfur. Non-signatories still
continue to call for a re-evaluation of the DPA, and have
noted their intention to continue fighting GOS forces if
provisions of the DPA are not reconsidered. Apparently,
Chadian authorities have demanded all Sudanese rebels groups
to leave Chad. However, according to representatives from
the Sudan Liberation Movement loyal to Minni, Chadian
authorities were trying to kidnap them and hand them over to
the Sudanese rebel non-signatories. END SUMMARY.

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DPA NON-SIGNATORIES CONTINUE TO RESIST KHARTOUM
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12. (C) On August 4, the Ambassador met with Sudanese
Liberation Movement, and National Redemption Front, member
Adam Shogar to discuss the recent activities by
non-signatories in Darfur. Shogar told the Ambassador that
non-signatories of the Darfur Peace Accords were still
unwilling to sign the document due to the DPA's failure to
protect the rights of the Darfurian people. He stated that
the DPA's inability to provide a level of proportional
political representation and economic wealth that the
Darfurian people deserved was unacceptable to the Darfurian
people. According to Shogar, opposition to the DPA by
Darfurians in the refugee camps in Chad and in Sudan is a
clear indication that the international community needs to
either alter the DPA to better reflect the needs of the
people of Darfur, or re-open negotiations for an accord that
is acceptable to Darfurians. The Ambassador told Shogar that
the United States still considered the DPA the best chance
for peace in Darfur, and hoped that hadn't signed the
agreement would reconsider their decision and support the
DPA.

13. (C) Shogar also said that violence was not the preferred option for the NRF non-signatories. Even though they hoped to have a constructive dialogue with SLM representatives loyal to Minni Minnawi, attacks by forces loyal to the SLM made a peaceful resolution impossible. Shogar claimed that attacks against NRF forces by SLM-Minni loyalists and GOS troops in the Birmazza area were repelled back, and the NRF controlled most of Western Darfur. He added that the Chadian military was not providing any support, and the NRF was obtaining military equipment and vehicles from victories against the Sudanese Armed Forces and Minni loyalists.

SLM Minni SUPPORTERS DENY INSTIGATING ATTACKS

14. (C) During a meeting with Economic/Consular Officer that same day, representatives of the SLM loyal to Minni stated that recent reports of attacks in villages near Korma were not conducted by SLM-Minni forces, but rather were acts of self-defense by Minni loyalists against members of the National Redemption Front and SLM forces loyal to AbdulWahid Ahmed Nur. They also accused Chadian regular military elements of assisting in the attacks against SLM Minni supporters.

15. (C) Abdallah Ahmed Tahir, security chief for the SLM-Minni representative office in N'Djamena, stated that non-signatories were conducting attacks against SLM-Minni loyalists due to a false belief that Sudanese Armed Forces were allied with Minni's forces. He denied this assertion,

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and said that while the GOS and the SLM were in agreement on the need for the implementation of the DPA, no troops loyal to Minni were working with the SAF. Tahir added that Minni's troops were not involved in last weekend's attacks by the GOS in the Jebel Moon.

CONTINUED CHADIAN INVOLVEMENT

16. (C) Both Shogar and the SLM-Minni supporters noted that Chadian authorities from the Ministry of Public Security asked all Sudanese rebel groups to leave Chad in the coming days. According to the groups, the Ministry stated that based on the recently-signed agreement with the Chadian and Sudanese governments, the GOC was obligated to stop housing members of the Sudanese rebel movement. Shogar told the Ambassador during their conversation that he and other members of the NRF in N'Djamena planned to return to Darfur to join other fighters in resisting the Sudanese government.

17. (C) On August 5, Djabadien Hussein, Information Officer for the SLM-Minni Minawi group, urgently telephoned Economic/Consular Officer to notify him that Chadian authorities from the Ministry of Public Security and a special advisor to Daoussa Deby (half-brother and counselor to President Deby) named Moussa Sner had threatened to forcefully remove all members of the SLM-Minni group from their current residence that day and immediately put them on an African Union plane to Darfur with Sudanese rebel non-signatories of the DPA.

18. (C) Hussein contended that the move was a ploy by Chadian authorities not only to remove supporters of Minni from Chad, but also to put them in the hands of their adversaries in the NRF. Hussein and others feared that once on their way to Darfur, opposing Sudanese rebels would attempt to either kill them, or incarcerate them in NRF-controlled establishments in Darfur. He finally said that his group had learned that GOC authorities were providing money and weapons to the NRF

members on their way to Darfur, to assist in operations against Minni's forces and Sudanese troop. On the night of August 6, Hussein told Economic/Consular officer that the GOC had finally backed off of its threat, apparently with intervention from the African Union, and would permit the Minni loyalists to stay in Chad for the moment. He added that the Minni loyalists was still concerned about future threats to physically threaten group members.

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